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ABSTRACT
There has been a recent trend in the video game industry that console makers (Sony,
Microsoft, and Nintendo) have been acquiring video game developers to make
games solely for their console. With a surge of acquisitions, these three console
makers have rapidly increased their market share of the console video game industry. But in doing so, have they started to run afoul of antitrust law? Do these three
console makers now have enough market power to exert control over the video
game industry like a monopoly? This article seeks to answer these questions, while
also suggesting several steps that console makers can take now to avoid the headache that is an antitrust violation in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 2019, Japanese entertainment conglomerate Sony announced
that they had acquired video game developer Insomniac Games.1 The company became the 14th video game studio bought by Sony to exclusively produce games for
their PlayStation video game console since their creation in 1994.2 Just one month
prior, Microsoft—software giant and maker of the PlayStation’s main competitor,
the Xbox—announced the acquisition of Double Fine Productions.3 The acquisition
was the 15th studio brought on to exclusively produce games for the Xbox. 4 These
acquisitions represent a new trend in the video game industry: console makers are
focused on acquiring video game studios to exclusively produce titles for their respective consoles (also called first-party developers or studios).5 In fact, Sony recently stated it is currently on the hunt to acquire more video game studios. 6
There are several possible explanations for this new trend. Console makers may
have vertically integrated as a way to compete with one another as differences between console hardware (historically where competition focused) have become increasingly marginal.7 Having select video game franchises produce games solely
for one console, or in other words, creating console exclusive video games, is one
way to do so.8 As it currently stands, Microsoft fans cannot experience the Uncharted or God of War series on the Xbox, and Sony fans do not have the opportunity to play through the Halo or Gears of War series on the PlayStation. While
these actions may effectively fall within guise of “anti-competitive” activity (having
a negative impact on the competitive market), is it flagrant enough to be an antitrust
violation?
What about other video game publishers and developers that must meet Sony,
Microsoft, and Nintendo standards in order for their games to be allowed on consoles? As of 2018, the number of console gamers is estimated to be about 86.5 million.9 Some games, such as the famous Kingdom Hearts series, appear only on consoles.10 If small producers could not meet their target console’s standards, then all
the time and resources poured into developing and marketing the games would be
1. Samit Sarkar, Sony to acquire Insomniac Games, POLYGON (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.polygon.com/2019/8/19/20812654/sony-buys-insomniac-games.
2. Press Release, Sony Interactive Entm’t, Sony Interactive Entertainment to Acquire Insomniac
Games (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.sie.com/en/corporate/release/2019/190820.html.
3. Ben Kuchera, Microsoft acquires Double Fine Productions, POLYGON (June 9, 2019),
https://www.polygon.com/e3/2019/6/9/18658708/microsoft-acquires-double-fine-studios-e3-2019first-party.
4. Matt Booty, Double Fine Productions Joins Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (June 9, 2019),
https://news.xbox.com/en-us/2019/06/09/double-fine-productions-joins-xbox-game-studios/.
5. The Faceless Rebel, What Is the Difference between 1st, 2nd and 3rd party Developers,
ARSTECHNICA (Jun. 13 2007, 1:42 AM), https://arstechnica.com/civis/viewtopic.php?t=206689.
6. Matt Purslow, Sony is Considering Studio Acquisitions Ahead of PS5, IGN (July 1, 2019),
https://www.ign.com/articles/2019/07/01/sony-is-considering-studio-acquisitions-ahead-of-ps5.
7. Felicia Miranda, The best video game consoles of 2020, DIG. TRENDS (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/best-gaming-consoles/.
8. One of the biggest factors that consumers consider when purchasing a console is the scope of the
console game library/exclusive content. See Matt Peckham, The Surprising Reasons People Buy the
PlayStation 4, Xbox One or Wii U, TIME (Feb. 26, 2015), https://time.com/3723953/console-buyers/.
9. Dustin Bailey, 35% of Americans are PC gamers, PC GAMES N (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.pcgamesn.com/pc-gamers-vs-console-gamers-numbers.
10. See, e.g., Square Enix Games, SQUARE ENIX, https://square-enix-games.com/en_US/games (last
visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Kingdom Hearts III as available only on the Xbox One and PS4 consoles).
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for naught; for a AAA game series like Kingdom Hearts,11 this amount would be at
least $60 million.12 Does this preferential treatment for acquired studios like Insomniac and Double Fine run afoul of antitrust law? So far, that answer is no, but these
console makers are inching ever closer toward crossing the line into violating the
laws on vertical mergers.
This article will examine whether the most popular major console makers—
Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo—have violated, or come dangerously close to violating, antitrust laws on vertical mergers due to these acquisitions. Part II will briefly
discuss the layout and some basic terminology of the video game industry. Part III
will provide an overview of relevant antitrust law and its implementation. Part IV
will examine whether there is a violation of antitrust laws on vertical mergers by
these console makers. Lastly, Part V will go over preventive measures that console
makers can take to avoid antitrust scrutiny.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE VIDEO GAME MARKET
The console video game market is made up of two main components: consoles
and video games. The three major console makers, Nintendo (makers of the Switch,
Wii U, and 3DS),13 Microsoft (makers of the Xbox One and Xbox One S),14 and
Sony (makers of the PlayStation 4 and PlayStation 4 Pro)15—hereafter referred to
as the “Big Three”—make up more than 90% of worldwide video game console
sales.16 Video games are made by video game developers (“studios”), of which there
are two types: first-party and third-party.17 First-party video game developers are
studios that are owned by one of the Big Three console makers and exclusively
make games for that console.18 This includes reputable studios such as Naughty
Dog (makers of the Uncharted series and The Last of Us),19 343 Studios (makers of
the Halo franchise),20 and Nintendo (creators of Mario, Zelda, and Metroid).21
Third-party studios, on the other hand, are not owned by a console maker, but instead produce games for any number of consoles.22 Notable third-party studios

11. Traditionally, AAA games were defined as games that were released by “mega-sized publishers,”
with Square Enix being one of those publishers. Rhys Pugatschew, Triple A Games: Defining What AAA
Games Actually Are, NERDMUCH? (May 17, 2019), https://www.nerdmuch.com/games/170501/triplea-games/.
12. Superannuation, How Much Does It Cost To Make A Big Video Game?, KOTAKU (Jan. 15, 2014),
https://kotaku.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-make-a-big-video-game-1501413649.
13. Nintendo, NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
14. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xboxgame-studios
15. SIE Worldwide Studios, PLAYSTATION.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.playstation.com/engb/footer/about-us/world-wide-studios/
16. USA Yearly Chart: The year’s top-selling games at retail ranked by unit sales, VG CHARTZ,
http://www.vgchartz.com/yearly/2019/USA/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
17. The Faceless Rebel, supra note 5.
18. Id.
19. About, NAUGHTY DOG, https://www.naughtydog.com/company (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
20. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM, https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-game-studios
(last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
21. Game Store, NINTENDO, https://www.nintendo.com/games/game-guide/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2020).
22. The Faceless Rebel, supra note 5.
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include Rockstar (makers of the Grand Theft Auto series),23 CD Project Red (makers of the Witcher series),24 Dice (makers of the Battlefield series),25 and Infinity
Ward (makers of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare).26
In addition to video game developers, there are also video game publishers—
entities that own several video game studios and focus on financing, marketing, and
distributing video games.27 Notable video game publishers include Take Two Interactive (owners of Rockstar),28 Electronic Arts (“EA”) (owners of Dice and various
sport games),29 and Activision (owners of Infinity Ward).30 While a video game
developer can choose to self-publish,31 most studios go through a publisher.32 Firstparty studios do not worry about publishers since the console makers also function
as a video game publisher.33

III. AN OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law covers a wide array of different anticompetitive acts. These range
from things such as restrictions on trade, price gouging, to mergers and acquisitions.
With a plethora of different acts covered by the antitrust law, it is important to focus
on what specifically is at issue when it is in relation to video game studio acquisition.

A. Relevant Governing Statutes
At the federal level, there are two primary antitrust statutes: the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act.34 In general, § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition
of another company if that acquisition would lead to a decrease in competition.35
More specifically, the statute states that
[n]o person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital . . ., where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
23. ROCKSTAR, https://www.rockstargames.com/games (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
24. CD PROJECT RED, https://en.cdprojektred.c¬om/ (last visited Mar 15, 2020).
25. Our Games, DICE, https://www.dice.se/games/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
26. Our Games, INFINITY WARD, https://www.infinityward.com/games (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
27. Paul Trowe, The Difference Between a Video Game Developer and Publisher, THE MEDIUM (Jun.
16, 2018), https://medium.com/@PaulTrowe/the-difference-between-a-video-game-developer-andpublisher-c6038324ee56.
28. TAKE TWO INTERACTIVE, https://www.take2games.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
29. Worldwide Studios, ELECTRONIC ARTS, https://www.ea.com/studios (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
30. Studios & Locations: Infinity Ward, ACTIVISION, https://www.activision.com/company/locations/infinity-ward (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
31. CD PROJECT RED, supra note 24; Dan Pearson, CD Projekt RED: “Independence is a crucial part
of our strategy,” GAMEINDUSTRY.BIZ (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2013-0307-cd-projekt-independence-is-a-crucial-part-of-a-our-strategy.
32. Trowe, supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 15, 2020); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2018).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
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acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.36
Here, console makers are buying up video game studios to exclusively develop
games for their consoles.37 This affects commerce in that consumers cannot enjoy
certain video games without also having to purchase the adjoining console. This
also leads to concerns of anti-competitive behavior: if a console maker is able to
gain enough market share in the video game industry, it can eventually compel competing video game developers to yield to its demands, which is likely to result in
anti-competitive results.

B. TYPE OF MERGERS
The next issue that needs to be determined is the type of merger created by
console makers buying up first-party studios. The federal antitrust enforcers—Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)—has two
established merger types: horizontal and non-horizontal.38 Horizontal mergers occur when two or more parties that compete in the same production market combine
into one entity.39 An example of this is when J.D. Rockefeller used tactics to acquire
all the surrounding oil fields, making him the sole supplier of oil.40 Non-horizontal
mergers, on the other hand, have previously referred to two separate types of mergers: vertical mergers and conglomerates.41 Both are mergers of two parties from
distinct fields that combine to create a single entity.42 For example, during the late
1800s, Scottish-American steel magnate Andrew Carnegie bought all the required
infrastructure necessary to make steel, spanning from mining rights, to railroads, to
the factories that actually produced the steel, all of which were combined into the
Carnegie Steel Company.43 Non-horizontal mergers have historically been challenged far less by the DOJ compared to their horizontal counterparts. 44 There are
several reasons why,45 but the most prominent is that the DOJ has found that “nonhorizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive
problems.”46
36. Id.
37. Richard Wakeling, Xbox’s New Studios Will Be Focused On Making Exclusive Games, GAMESPOT
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/xboxs-new-studios-will-be-focused-on-makingexclus/1100-6469279/; Robin Burks, Sony First-Party Games Might Not All Be Playstation Exclusives,
SCREENRANT (Aug. 20, 2019), https://screenrant.com/sony-first-party-exclusive-platforms-pc/.
38. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf; Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
DEP’T OF JUST. 1, https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1175141/download?mkwid=c (last visited Mar.
15, 2020).
39. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE §12.1 (4th ed. 2011).
40. BRIA 16 2 b Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Monopoly, CONST. RTS. FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-16-2-b-rockefeller-and-the-standard-oil-monopoly.html.
41. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 12.1.
42. Id.
43. United States Steel Corporation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-Steel-Corporation (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
44. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39.
45. Id. at §9.5.
46. Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 38.
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The acquisition of studios by console makers are vertical mergers. As mentioned previously, console markets and video game development markets are distinct from one another. If the issue was that a single video game studio was buying
fellow studios, that would likely create a horizontal merger issue, because the entities at issue would share the same market. Further, the type of merger here is not
likely to represent a conglomerate merger because even though such mergers occur
between two firms in distinctly different markets, conglomerate mergers require
that those distinct markets are not related in any capacity to one another. 47 Put differently, in a conglomerate merger, the products of one firm are not strategically
related to the products of another firm. For example, if a console maker bought a
company that made office chairs, this would likely be a conglomerate merger; while
people may use office chairs to play video games on consoles, the chairs are not a
necessary component to enjoying a video game console, and conversely, it is not
necessary to own a video game console to use an office chair. That leaves the game
studio acquisitions to be judged under vertical merger guidelines. Since video
games and consoles are part of the same supply chain – video games serve as an
input to video game consoles – the acquisition of those who make video games by
the console makers are becoming more vertically integrated. This all supports the
likelihood that console makers acquiring video game studios would be analyzed as
a vertical merger.

C. Who Could Bring Suit?
Once indicators reveal that an antitrust law issue, the next question is who could
raise a concern over a violation. In general, most antitrust suits are brought by private plaintiffs,48 though the federal government is the only entity able to bring criminal charges.49 The federal government usually will not bring suit unless it is in
violation of one of the merger guidelines.50 On the other hand, private plaintiffs
bring antitrust suits at a much greater rate,51 but they run into two general problems:52 first, in order to bring an antitrust suit, plaintiffs must first satisfy the direct
purchaser rule;53 second, the plaintiff must show an antitrust harm.
The direct purchaser rule requires that the plaintiff be within one degree of
separation from the antitrust harm.54 This generally serves as a prohibition against
“pass-on,” which is when intermediaries shift the burden of an antitrust harm down
the line of commerce.55 Potential plaintiffs within one degree of separation of harm
include video game publishers who are now foreclosed from the opportunity to acquire the studio themselves. For reasons discussed later, the size of the video game
developer market is vast enough that the acquisition of a single studio is likely

47. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39.
48. The Enforcers, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/enforcers (last visited Apr. 9, 2020).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2013). Chapter 4, I, A.
53. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 736.
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insufficient to justify a foreclosure harm.56 The other potential plaintiff could be
your average video game end consumer; the harm in this case would be that the end
consumer is excluded from playing certain games without purchasing the requisite
console (a concept called “tying”).57 While it was once debatable if ordinary end
consumers are within a degree of separation should they buy the physical copy of
the game (due to the presence of brick-and-mortar retailers), a recent court decision
has firmly placed them within the degree of separation.58 In Apple v. Pepper, the
Court found that those who purchased apps from the Apple App Store were within
the necessary degree of separation.59 Since each console maker also operates a digital market place, similar to that of an app store, end consumers should have no
problem satisfying the direct purchaser rule.60
The second problem in bringing antitrust suits by private plaintiffs is establishing an antitrust harm. This is especially the case in a § 7 claim since the harm alleged
is more likely to be subtle.61 Typically, the alleged harms include firms who are
charged a monopoly price due to a merger, a firm that struggles to maintain the
efficiencies of a merged firm, or an independent distributor who lost a supplier.62
In the video game industry, the harm being suffered is either the loss of a supplier
or the inability to compete with the merged firm’s efficiency. The loss of a supplier
comes from the fact that there is a decrease in the number of studios that produce
games for all consoles. The inability to compete with efficiency comes from video
game publishers who cannot produce games at the same quality or price as the console makers, though this harm will probably suffer for being too speculative.

D. Determining Market Power
One of the most difficult things to do in antitrust litigation is determining a
firm’s market power.63 However, as the Supreme Court noted in duPont, “[d]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation
of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition ‘within the area of effective competition.’” 64 To do
this, courts generally participate in a three step process: (1) determining a relevant
product market, (2) determining a relevant geographic market, and (3) computing
the percentage output.65

i. Determining the Relevant Product Market
In determining the relevant product market, the goal is to find the smallest possible market that would be affected by a “small but significant nontransitory
56. See infra Part IV.
57. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 52.
58. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 U.S. 1514 (2019).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 52.
62. Id.
63. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §3.1.
64. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (citing Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n. 5 (1949)).
65. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.8; See also Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications,
435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
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increase in price” (“SSNIP”). 66 For example, if Kellogg’s, the makers of the cereal
Froot Loops, decides to increase the price of its cereal by 5%, what would consumers do? More than likely, they will just buy the discount knock offs of Froot Loops,
such as Tootie Fruities.67 The strong similarity of the substitutes makes this market
too small to be the relevant product market.68 If we expand the seller’s power to
increase the price on all fruit related cereals by 5%, consumers might just switch
cereals to something like Cheerios or Frosted Flakes. Again, the relative similarity
of the substitute products makes the market too small to deem relevant.
But what if the price of all cereals increased by 5%? Consumers would likely
be stuck paying the extra 5% because the alternatives—like waffles or fruit—are so
different from the base market that consumers would rather pay the extra fee.69 It is
at this point that a relevant product market is therefore determined.70
In the case of video game console makers, there is at least an arguable case that
there is a relevant product market. If the console makers were to increase the price
of a certain franchise of games,71 such as Call of Duty, consumers would probably
move on to another first-person shooter franchise,72 such as Battlefield. If console
makers instead raised the price on an entire genre of games, such as first-person
shooters, there would certainly be grumblings, but ultimately consumers would
likely switch to other comparable genres, such as third-person shooters.73
Now if console makes were to raise the price of all video games on their consoles, there are likely two viable outcomes: either consumers begrudgingly pay the
higher price due to the perceived lack of alternatives, or they switch to playing video
games in other ways, such as on their phone or personal computer (“PC”). 74 The
former would establish that the console video game market is the relevant product
market; the latter would not. The issue with the latter is determining how reasonable
it would be to switch to a different video game platform.
At the moment, smartphones are not as powerful as current generation video
game consoles (due to the relative lack of internal hardware capability), but that gap
is closing.75 While PCs can possess similar (and in most cases, greater) internal
66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.8a.
67. Mike Hughlett, Bagged Knockoff Cereals Taking Bites out of Name Brands’ Revenue, LA TIMES
(June 24, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2012-jun-24-la-fi-cereal-20120625story.html.
68. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. This is under the assumption that if the console makers were to raise the price of using their console to the various other publishers and developers, that those publishers and developers would pass-on
the price increase to consumers. The issue of who would have standing to sue console makers will be
addressed later on.
72. A first-person shooter is “a type of video game in which the player view the action through the
eyes of a character and has to attack enemies.” First-person shooter, OXFORD LEARNER’S
DICTIONARIES,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/first-personshooter?q=first+person+shooter (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
73. A third-person shooter is “a game focused on shooting where, instead of seeing through the main
character’s eyes, you see the main character from an external perspective.” Know you Genres: ThirdPerson Shooters, XBOX WIRE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://news.xbox.com/en-us/2015/10/09/games-knowyour-genres-third-person-shooters/.
74. Keith Stuart, How Do I Start Playing Video Games? A beginner’s guide, THE GUARDIAN (Feb.
18, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/18/how-do-i-start-playing-video-gamesa-beginners-guide.
75. Smartphones Will Soon Be More Powerful Than Game Consoles, STUFF (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.stuff.co.nz/entertainment/games/77134952/.
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hardware capability compared to consoles,76 it is currently unreasonable to find a
PC with comparable internal specifications at a similar price that can perform at a
comparable level to consoles.77 This would render the alternatives to game consoles
wholly unreasonable, and therefore not part of a reasonable product market.
Another factor to consider in determining relevant product market is the ability
of other sellers to enter into the market.78 If there is a rush of sellers that want to
enter the market, the implication is that the market is controlled by a monopoly, and
that the invading sellers want to take advantage of that opportunity. 79 Conversely,
if there is not a flux of new sellers joining the market, the implication is that either
the market is perfectly competitive (meaning that there is not market to exploit) or
that the barriers to entry are too high.80
In the present case, there is steady stream of new video game developers into
the market. This is made evident by the rise of “indie gaming,” which refers to an
influx of small, upstart game studios.81 In terms of the console market, there has
been a relative dearth of new competition to the Big Three with one notable exception: in late 2019, Google released Stadia, a gaming experience meant to rival game
consoles by streaming all their games rather than providing a piece of hardware.82
Since Google Stadia is new to the market, it is hard tell how it will affect the console
market and the race for exclusives.

ii. Determining Geographic Market
Geographic market is the area in which a firm can fully exercise its market
power.83 To determine a firm’s geographic market, courts generally see if a price
increase in the potential area will either (1) encourage consumers to find a substitute
outside the area, or (2) encourage producers to flood the market with substitute
goods.84 In the current situation, the geographic market is likely the least contentious aspect, since video games are carried and sold in stores nationwide. The geographic market for video games is analogous to the situation in United States v.
Alcoa.85 In Alcoa, a producer of aluminum shipped and sold its product all across
76. “In short, then, today’s PCs will stomp all over the Xbox One (and PS4) in terms of raw computation power.” Sebastian Anthony, PlayStation 4 vs. Xbox One vs. PC: In depth specs comparison, IT
PRO PORTAL (June 11, 2013), https://www.itproportal.com/2013/06/11/playstation-4-vs-xbox-one-vspc-how-the-hardware-specs-stack-up/.
77. Brandon Hart, Good $500 Gaming PC Build vs. Xbox One X and PS4 Pro 2019, LEVEL SKIP (Jan.
23, 2019), https://levelskip.com/consoles/400-gaming-pc-vs-console; See also Sebastian Anthony, Can
You Build A Gaming PC Better Than the PS4 for $400?, EXTREME TECH (Nov. 18, 2013),
https://www.extremetech.com/gaming/171158-can-you-build-a-gaming-pc-better-than-the-ps4-for-400
(PC build could rival consoles in quality and price, but the optimization of consoles makes any raises
concerns of comparability).
78. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.3.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Tracey Lien, How Indie Games Went Mainstream, POLYGON (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.polygon.com/2013/10/4/4768148/the-next-generation-of-indies.
82. Chris Morris, Google Stadia Goes Live in November, FORTUNE (June 6, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/06/06/google-stadia-video-game-publishers/.
83. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.6.
84. Id.; See also Baxley-DeLamar v. American Cemetery Ass’n, 938 F.2d 846, 850 (8th Cir. 1991)
(Geographic area is “the geographic area in which the defendant faces competition and to which consumers can practically turn for alternative sources of the product).
85. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the nation, leading the court to determine that the relevant geographic market for
the product was nationwide.86 Similarly, since video games are sold and distributed
across the nation, the relevant geographic market is nationwide.

iii. Computing Market Share
Conceptually, computing market share is straightforward—you simply take an
individual firm’s output (in this case, console maker’s first-party developer games)
and divide that by market output (all other games on consoles) over a set period of
time.87 The tricky part comes with what inputs are used to determine a firm’s and
market’s output. For example, to determine an individual firm’s output, do you use
the number of units sold, or revenue? This comes down to the variability of price
per unit between the firm and the market as a whole, and whether one of the two
entities prove to be an outlier.88 A firm could sell a mere fraction of units that an
average competitor would sell, but if the firm priced their units substantially higher
than their competition, they could conceivably have a majority market share despite
having actually sold less units than their competitors. The inverse is also possible:
a firm can sell a disproportionately higher number of units compared to the average
competitor, but if they undercharge for their product, they can have the majority
market share in output without the market share in revenue.
Another issue is whether to use output or capacity to determine market output.
Output is simply what the market actually produced, while capacity refers to the
maximum amount that the market could theoretically produce. 89 While using actual
output seems intuitive, there are shortcomings that arise out of using output that
does not happen when using capacity. If most firms in the market are producing
output at an inefficient level, and the firm in question is producing output efficiently, then the efficient firm is penalized by being treated as a monopoly, despite
the likelihood that they would be viewed as a normal firm in a competitive, efficient
market.90
One of the key economic goals of antitrust legislation is to punish inefficient
market behavior by firms,91 and using only market output as a measurement penalizes desired behavior.92 Instead, if market capacity was used as the measurement,
then the calculations involving the inefficient firms would be corrected, ultimately
not penalizing competitively efficient firms.93 Using market capacity has its own
drawbacks, with one of the biggest being that it is a poor measurement in light of
real-world circumstances. There could be extenuating circumstances that make typically efficient output producing firms become inefficient, such as changes in a law
that require new measures for compliance, natural disasters, etc.94 Both situations
are incredibly rare though, and as long as they are accounted for when computing
market share, it should not be an issue.95
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 3.7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 3.7a.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 3.7b.
Id.
Id.
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According to DOJ guidelines, there is a preference to using revenue as the
measurement for the numerator since “they reflect the real-world ability of firms to
surmount all of the obstacles necessary to offer products on terms and conditions
that are attractive to customers.”96 In regards to capacity versus output, DOJ has
indicated that “capacities or reserves may better reflect the future competitive significance of suppliers than revenues, and the Agencies may calculate market shares
using those measures.”97
In the present case, first-party developers have constituted 30.86% of all video
game sales over the past five years.98 Additionally, their total unit output and market
share percentage has increased every year since 2015, with the most recent year
showing a 40.26% market share.99

IV. DETERMINING AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION
With both the type of merger defined (vertical) and the market share established, we are prepared to examine whether any of the Big Three have violated
antitrust law. In general, for vertical mergers, courts look at four factors: (1) whether
competitors of the supplier or the buyer will be foreclosed from the market, (2)
whether there is a trend towards vertical integration in the market, (3) whether there
is an intent to foreclose competition, and (4) whether barriers to entry are erected
foreclosing equal access to markets.100 Courts do not always adhere strictly to the
four-factor test, and sometimes, courts also use a more holistic analysis that compares the pro-competitive benefits of a merger against the anti-competitive concerns.101 When applying this holistic approach, courts complete their analysis
through the perspective of an end consumer; in other words, the analysis of the
effects on competition is not directly concerned with the well-being of competitors,
but rather that of the consumers.102 Either way, the process is an intensive fact-based
determination.103

A. Anti-Competitive Concerns
There are several anti-competitive concerns that arise when there is a tentative
vertical merger. These concerns fall into three main categories: (1) strategic control
of inputs, (2) price discrimination, and (3) foreclosure to entry barriers.

i. Strategic Control of Inputs
When a company begins a vertical merger, they start to gain greater market
pressure. By controlling the inputs of an industry, a firm can keep their competitors
from acquiring the same inputs that they need to be able to operate. 104 For the case
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 38.
Id.
USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16.
Id.
BRENT A. OLSON, SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT—VERTICAL MERGERS § 22:67 (2019).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992).
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 9.3b.
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at hand, if a console maker starts acquiring game studios in bulk, then that will
prevent other game publishers and even other console makers from acquiring video
games from that studio. That would be a deprivation of that input in the video game
market. This is noticeable today by the quality of the inputs becoming exclusive.
Games that critically renowned, such as the recent God of War, are exclusive to one
console, and are thereby depriving others from being able to sell the game on their
console.105 There is also the issue of how strategically controlling the inputs can
affect the downstream market. By controlling more intermediate steps of the selling
process, the merging business can begin to flex power not just as a single business
entity, but as an entire commerce chain.106 For example, Sony would be able to tell
game publisher EA that they will not list an EA game on their online store unless
EA produced games solely for Sony consoles. This might pressure physical retailers
to either hide the game or remove it from their shelves all together.

ii. Price Discrimination
Another anti-competitive tool that the ‘Big Three’ could use is outright price
discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when a company charges different customers different prices for the same product.107 This is a concern with vertical mergers due to the fact that companies, merely by selling their products to different
industries, can price discriminate in multiple markets. 108 For example, a firm that
makes video games can charge the manufacturer suggested retail price (“MSRP”)
at brick and mortar stores, but then proceed to sell the same video games for a steep
discount on their own digital stores. The concern about price fixing is that it produces highly inefficient results that seem patently unfair.109 By charging different
prices, it raises two key problems that promote inefficiency: the motivated buyer
problem and promoting the use of arbitrage.
The first problem is that discriminatory pricing does not always permit the most
motivated buyer to actually obtain the product.110 For example, if a customer wants
to buy a game from a brick and mortar store, where the average price tends to be
$60, but the customer only has the ability to pay $54, then the customer will not be
able to obtain the product. In contrast, if the same game is available online on the
digital store of one of the ‘Big Three’ at $40, and the customer was willing to pay
up to $45 to obtain the game, that customer is still able to acquire the game. In this
example, even though the first customer valued the product more, they were unable
to obtain the game, while the second customer, who valued the same product for
less, was able to obtain it. This leads to an inefficient (and facially unfair) result, in
that the person who values the product less was able to obtain the product over the
person who valued it more.

105. Based on its high Metacritic score, which is a reviewer conglomerate score, God of War is one of
the highest rated games of the past decade. See God of War, METACRITIC, https://www.metacritic.com/game/playstation-4/god-of-war (last visited Apr. 9, 2020).
106. Michael Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 354–55 (1988).
107. Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 560 (2006).
108. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at § 9.3b.
109. Edwards, supra note 107, at 583–84.
110. Id. at 559.
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The second problem with price discrimination is that it promotes the use of
arbitrage.111 Arbitrage occurs when a retailer buys up a product at a discounted rate,
then proceeds to sell that product at a slightly lower price than their competitor, in
order to gain sales.112 This concept is best illustrated through an example. Say that
an individual buys a video game on from a digital store for $40, receiving a digital
download code. The individual then takes the digital code, writes it down, and opens
a stall next to the brick and mortar store selling the download code to these games.
The individual chooses to sell these codes at a price of $55, which is less the brick
mortar store using the MSRP of $60. By offering a discount for the same product
as the brick and mortar store, the individual profits $15 per sale while depriving the
brick and mortar store a sale. While the net decrease in price might seem like a
benefit to the consumer since they are getting the product they want at a cheaper
price, they have contributed to the creation of a new issue: a rise in this informal,
unregulated market. The potential for arbitrage also coincides with a rise in unregulated startups that focus solely on a quick profit turnaround. 113 These businesses
present opportunities for unsavory companies to take advantage of consumers due
to the lack of regulation and oversight.114

iii. Foreclosure and Entry Barriers
By increasing the amount of inputs necessary to operate a business in a market,
the entry barriers to that market are increased.115 Some markets naturally have
higher barriers of entry compared to others.116 For example, the barriers to entry for
video game console makers are likely significant due to the costs of setting up factories to assemble the consoles, research and development of components to make
the console, marketing the console, and the most recent requirement of having some
type of exclusive game for your console.117 By contrast, the barriers to entry into
the video game market are likely low due to the fact that games can be created with
open source software that is free to the public.118 The concern with vertical mergers
is that for future video game developers to be profitable, they likely either have to
sell exclusively to one console maker or create their own console. By having a tight
grip over the console market, and expanding into video games creation, console
makers have the leverage to force game developers into exclusive arrangements, 119
which hurt consumers in the end.120 This is because customers are either deprived
of the ability to experience a game, due to lacking a given console, or incurring
steep expenses in obtaining multiple consoles to play all of these exclusive games.
111. Frank Partnoy, The Law of Two Prices: Regulatory Arbitrage, Revisited, 107 GEO. L.J. 1017, 1019
(2019).
112. Id.
113. See id. (“So long as the relevant regulation is in place and some market participants continue to
trade the regulated good, a price difference between a regulated and unregulated good is likely to persist.”).
114. Id. at 1027.
115. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Salinger, supra note 106, at 346.
119. Id.; Kyle Orland, The rise and fall (and rise and fall) of gaming’s third-party exclusives,
ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 13, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2014/08/the-rise-and-falland-rise-and-fall-of-gamings-third-party-exclusives/.
120. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.2b.
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B. Pro-Competitive Benefits
In stark contrast to fears of vertical mergers decreasing competition, they also
have the capacity to benefit the consumer market. In general, there are two major
pro-competitive benefits of a vertical merger: reducing transaction costs and eliminating double marginalization.
A merged business needs less coordination with outside companies, and can
instead rely on its own resources.121 The ability of a company to dictate its own
delivery times, shipping quotas, and quality standards helps improve a company’s
efficiency and quality.122 This leads to a reduction of transaction costs, which could
potentially lead to lower prices.123
The other pro-competitive benefit is that a vertical merger eliminates double
marginalization, which is the “exercise of market power at successive vertical layers
in a supply chain.”124 For example, assume that a consumer wants to buy a printer
with some ink. The printer and the ink are made by two separate companies. The
consumer is willing to spend up to $300 to get a printer with some ink. The cost of
the printer is $250 while the ink costs $30. In a perfectly competitive market, when
both the printer and ink manufacturer do not have market power, that is the end of
the story; the consumer makes their respective purchases and walks away with $20
surplus value. However, if one of the two entities has market power, the analysis
does not stop at the consumer receiving that surplus value. Assume that the printer
manufacturer has market power, but the ink manufacturer does not. In this case, the
printer manufacturer will increase its price to capture that $20 surplus, raising the
printer price to $270, making the whole package $300. This is a single marginalization, which is still a fair result, since the consumer is walking away with the product at their maximum value of the product. If, however, both the printer and ink
manufacturer have market power, then we run into double marginalization. In this
case, both the ink and printer manufacturer will increase their price to capture that
$20 surplus, and without coordination, will each raise the price of their product by
$20. That would make the entire package cost $320, exceeding the customer’s maximum price and leading to a lost sale. In this scenario, everyone loses: the consumer
does not get their desired product, and both manufacturers lose out on a sale.
This last scenario could have been avoided with coordination, thus illustrating
why vertical integration is important.125 Vertical integration would have allowed
the ink and printer manufacturer to coordinate their prices to capture the most
amount of surplus while still getting the sale.126 Vertical integration ensures that the
consumer gets their desired product and also incentivizes businesses to create more
products that consumers want.127 If businesses know that they can capture all the
consumer surplus through vertical integration, then they will continue to produce
products that will incur repeat customers.128
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Career Anna, Double Marginalization: Supply Chain Management Concept, CAREER ANNA (July
4, 2015), https://www.careeranna.com/articles/double-marginalization/.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 909, 955 (2011).
128. Id.
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C. Four Factor Analysis
In addition to the analysis on the competitive effects of a merger, there are four
general factors that courts look at to determine whether a merger is in fact an antitrust violation.129 Courts look at whether the merger will result in (1) future foreclosure from a market, (2) a trend toward integration, (3) intent to foreclose others from
the market, and (4) creating greater entry barriers that lead to foreclosure.130

i. Foreclosure from the Market
Foreclosure from the market is intuitive: it considers whether a console maker
buying video game studios forecloses competitors from entering the video game
market. The competitors in this case would be various video game publishers and
independent studios. Strictly speaking, console makers buying video game studios
does not preclude other studios from developing games on consoles. Video game
publishers and independent studios frequently produce games for multiple consoles;
in fact, some of the best-selling games owe their popularity to being available on
all consoles, and not being tied down with exclusive deals. 131 Therefore, the facts
in this analysis tend to show that there is a lack of an anti-competitive effect.

ii. Trend Toward Vertical Integration
For the second factor, courts look at the behavior of the firms in question to
determine whether they have showed a pattern of actions that amount to increasing
vertical integration.132 Examining recent actions taken by console makers, it seems
clear that there is an increasing trend toward vertical integration.133 Two of the largest console makers, Sony and Microsoft, acquired reputable third-party studios in
2019.134 By doing so, the two console makers now have more first-party studios
than ever before.135 With each acquisition, console makers increase their market
share in the video game market, thereby also increasing the degree of vertical integration. For example, Sony’s recent acquisition of Insomniac Games increased their
market share in 2019 by 5%.136 The amount of acquisitions does not seem to be
stopping anytime soon. Microsoft’s desire to create more profitable exclusive
games,137 and Sony’s expressed desire to acquire more first-party studios,138 indicate that the trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Taking this into account,
129. OLSON, supra note 100, § 22:67.
130. Id.
131. This can be seen in that the majority of the top ten selling each year are sold across multiple
consoles. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16.
132. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39.
133. See id.
134. Kuchera, supra note 3; Samit Sarkar, Sony to acquire Insomniac Games, POLYGON (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.polygon.com/2019/8/19/20812654/sony-buys-insomniac-games.
135. Welcome to Xbox Game Studios, XBOX.COM (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.xbox.com/en-US/xboxgame-studios;
SIE
Worldwide
Studios,
PLAYSTATION.COM
(Sept.
8,
2019),
https://www.playstation.com/en-gb/footer/about-us/world-wide-studios/
136. This is due to the impact of the game that Insomniac released that year, Spiderman. USA Yearly
Chart, supra note 16.
137. Kuchera, supra note 3.
138. Purslow, supra note 6.
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it is likely that a court would view the actions by console makers as trending toward
vertical integration.

iii. Intent to Foreclose Competition
The third factor, intent to foreclose competition, is likely the trickiest factor to
evaluate. The purpose of this factor is to determine whether a firm intends to restrict
competition to their benefit.139 Courts have also determined that intent can be inferred from actions without any overt type of agreement.140 At the moment, none of
the ‘Big Three’ have come out to explicitly say that they intend to either force out
or acquire various video game publishers and independent studios. However, finding evidence of a blatant agreement that physically exists is incredibly rare.141 In
other words, it is unlikely that businesses are foolish enough to put an illegal agreement in writing and preserve it.142 Therefore, most analyses done for intent are conducted by examining a firm’s actions.143
In the past, the ‘Big Three’ have repeatedly stated that third-party support is
crucial for the survival of their consoles.144 It is no surprise that the most recent
console that struggled to remain viable, the Nintendo Wii U, had the weakest thirdparty support of a console in over a decade.145 This seems to indicate a lack of intent
to vertically integrate due to importance of third-party support.
Recent trends, however, cast some doubt as to whether console makers believe
in the necessity of independent third-party studios. One of the newest trends in the
video game industry is the use of exclusive deals, wherein video game publishers
will offer some type of benefit to purchase a game on a certain console. 146 These
benefits range from trivial things such as some type of exclusive in-game cosmetic
item, to more concerning benefits such as additional in-game story content.147 While
these exclusive deals are not in perpetuity, the increasing trend of using them should
raise concerns of future integration. For lack of a better phrase, exclusive deals are
a gateway to vertical integration. So, while the increasing amount of exclusive deals
may be cause for concern, there is likely still a gap between exclusive deal agreements and complete vertical integration.
139. HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.4.
140. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
141. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 52.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Third-party games will drive Nintendo’s Switch in 2018: Analyst, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/04/26/third-party-games-will-drive-nintendos-switch-in-2018-analyst.html; Ollie Barder, Nintendo Is Well Aware Of The Importance Of Third-Party Support For The
Switch, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/olliebarder/2017/01/19/nintendo-is-wellaware-of-the-importance-of-third-party-support-for-the-switch/#49aa8ca6220b; Paolo Sirio, Sony:
Third Party Deals For PlayStation 4 Games Is Important To Us, It Will Continue In 2016, GAMEPUR
(Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.gamepur.com/news/21075-sony-third-party-deals-playstation-4-games-important-us-it-will-continue.html; Matthew Handrahan, Third-party sales boosted Microsoft Gaming revenue in Q3, GAMES INDUSTRY (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2018-04-27third-party-sales-boosted-microsoft-gaming-revenue-in-q3.
145. Barder, supra note 144.
146. Kirk Hamilton, What A Video Game ‘Exclusive’ Means In 2017, KOTAKU (June 6, 2017),
https://kotaku.com/what-a-video-game-exclusive-means-in-2017-1796024566
147. For a recent example, the famous Call of Duty series announced an exclusive online game-mode
exclusive for players on PlayStation for a year. Id.
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iv. Erection of Barriers to Entry that Foreclose from Market
For the final factor, courts will look at whether a proposed merger creates additional barriers to entry that foreclose the market.148 Barriers of entry are components that are necessary to operate in a given market.149 For example, consider the
oil industry: you cannot operate in the oil industry without an oil well, so having
the capital necessary to either purchase or build an oil well is necessary to enter the
oil industry. In our analysis, the question becomes whether the console makers acquisition of first-party studios has led to an increase of entry barriers in the video
game industry.
At the moment, the answer is likely that there has not been an increase in entry
barriers. There is no evidence that entry barriers have raised in video game development due to acquisitions of first-party studios. While there is not a current issue,
it is not hard to foresee an increase in barriers in the future. For example, if console
makers add more requirements to have games be playable on their console or make
the current requirements more difficult to comply with, while also giving support
or an outright pass on compliance with these new requirements to their first-party
studios, this may represent a barrier to entry.

D. Evaluation
The most pertinent part of the conversation now becomes whether the ‘Big
Three’ are in violation of antitrust laws by using vertical mergers to inflict anticompetitive effects on consumers. One of the first things to consider is their ability
to effectively enforce any anti-competitive effect through their market power. With
only 30.86% market share in the video game market,150 it is arguable that since the
‘Big Three’ do not control a third of the market, they could not effectively use their
market power to implement anti-competitive effects. However, the Supreme Court
has held differently.151 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court found that the
defendant company had instituted anti-competitive effects on consumers with only
5% market share.152
While the ‘Big Three’ theoretically have the market share necessary to institute
an anti-competitive effect, the next concern is whether they can practically implement it. They have mostly avoided anti-competitive scrutiny due to the presence of
competing video game publishers to keep them in check. Video game publishers
make up roughly 40% of the market share for video game console sales. 153 It is the
strength of these publishers, especially since they reliably create a third of the top
ten selling games each year,154 that keep a check on the console makers ability to
institute anti-competitive effects. By maintaining a significant market share, these
publishers can easily battle back against any strategic limitation of inputs
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

OLSON, supra note 100, § 22:67.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, at §9.4b.
USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Id.
USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16.
Id.
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established by video game developers. In addition, any attempt to implement price
discrimination would be met with the threat of removing publishers’ games from
those platforms, which would be economically disastrous to the console developers.155 Lastly, the entry barriers are likely to remain stable, due again to threats by
publishers to withhold games from the consoles. Thanks to the presence of strong
video game publishers, console makers are disincentivized from implementing anticompetitive effects through their increasing video game developer acquisitions.

V. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO AVOID ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
How long can the video game publishers maintain the status quo in holding
back the anti-competitive effects of video game console makers? First-party studios
have been steadily increasing their market share since 2015.156 In addition, the
stated intention of the ‘Big Three’ to acquire more first-party studios will only hasten the increase of market share by these console makers.157 If the console makers
are able to reach a point where they can economically survive on the sales of their
first-party studio games and those that have exclusive dealings with that studio, then
the Big Three can leverage the various video game publishers to acquiesce to their
anti-competitive demands, and ultimately harm the consumer. At that point, it is
undoubtable that the either the federal government, or possibly a brave publisher,
will bring an antitrust suit against the ‘Big Three.’ What can they do, either now or
before the potential suit, to satisfy the concerns of anti-competitive practices?
The key to avoiding most antitrust suits is ensuring that all actions benefit consumers at the end of the day.158 The biggest pro-consumer measure that the ‘Big
Three’ can implement is allowing their first-party studios to develop games that are
available on all platforms. This would allow consumers to choose a console without
the concern about the availability of games, forcing console makers to compete
based on the quality of their consoles, and not about the list of exclusive video game
studios. Including a time period of sole exclusivity to first-party studio games may
make this more feasible to the console makers and cause them to soften their stance
on this issue. This provides some incentive to pick a certain console over another, 159
but because consumers know that it will eventually reach all consoles, they now
have the choice of whether they either patiently wait for the game to release or make
another console purchase.
Another possible solution is to divest control over the various digital video
game marketplaces.160 Since the ‘Big Three’ also control the digital marketplaces
on their various consoles,161 they can easily skew the market showings to favor their
proprietary games over those of various video game publishers, even if those games
end up being derivative, overpriced, and of a lower quality than the publisher’s
games. The ability to effectively suppress the games of competing video game
155. Handrahan, supra note 144.
156. USA Yearly Chart, supra note 16.
157. Id.
158. Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 Antitrust
L.J. 11 (2009).
159. NPD: PS3 sales spike on MGS4, GAMESPOT (July 17, 2008), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/npd-ps3-sales-spike-on-mgs4/1100-6194691/.
160. Waller, supra note 158, at 12.
161. Id. at 24.
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publishers is arguably too great and could eventually need to be curtailed. By divesting ownership of the digital marketplace to outside companies, the ‘Big Three’
would be forced to compete on a more even playing field to reach the featured section on a third-party marketplace.

VI. CONCLUSION
While the video game console makers are likely not in violation of antitrust
laws at the moment due to acquiring more first-party studios, the trend of these firstparty studios gaining more market share could eventually put them in the crosshairs
of antitrust regulators, and they will need a plan to avoid their ire.
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